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Case No. 15324 
Case No. 15325 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEHENT OF' THE CASE 
1. The Pleadings and Judgment 
These are companion actions by Producers Livestock 
Loan Cofll'Jany (hereinafter "Producers"), a Utah corporation, 
to recover asserted indebtedness of defendant-respondants, 
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both of whom are residents of New York State. Th e operat: 
allegations of the two Complaints practicially are ident: 
differing only in the amounts of alleged indebtedness p'.o: 
tiff seeks to recover from each defendant. ~- 2-3. ll., :. 
As is stated in appellant's Brief, plaintiff has asserte.:. 
sonal jurisdiction over defendants pursuant to the terms:: 
the Utah Long-Arm Statute (UTAH CODE AflN. § 78-27-24, ~ 
(1977 Repl. Vol.)) and process was served upon them in ~E: 
York State. Br. 2. 
Plaintiff's claim of personal jurisdiction was b;:, 
upon allegations that 
... defendant[s] made application for [their] 
loan[s] at Salt Lake City, Utah; that the terms 
of the note [ s] provide for payment at Salt Lake 
City, Utah; that the purpose of the loan[s] was 
for the financing of livestock and feed; and 
that defendant[s'] livestock manager conducted 
all of its business activities on behalf of de-
fendant[s] in Salt Lake City, Utah; and that the 
activities of defendant[s] within the State of 
Utah, both personally and by [their] managi~ 
agent, constitute the transaction of business 
within this State to satisfy the Utah Long Arr 
Statutes. [Sic] 
R. 3. M., 3. L. 
The Complaints were filed on October 10, 1976 (~ · 
M., 2. L.) and service was made some time later· On AprL · 
1977, defendants, appearing specially, moved, pursuant to: 
terms of Rule 12(b) (2), (4), (5), Utah Rules of Civil Pre:: 
ure, that the action be dismissed for lack of personal v: 
die ti on and, further and al terna ti ve ly, for insufficienC:-' .· 
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process and/or of service of process. ~- 15-16. M., 4-5. L. 
Substantial discovery was taken on those motions and support-
ing and opposing papers were filed with the court. The motions 
came on for hearing on June 27, 1977, when counsel, after being 
heard at length, submitted the matter. 1 On June 30, the trial 
court, "having heard the statements of counsel, reviewed the 
pleadings, affidavits, moving and opposing papers of the par-
ties on file herein, and the deposition of George L. Smith 
taken on May 31, .1977 (which was received and published by stipu-
lation of the parties)", dismissed the action for lack of per-
2 
sonal jurisdiction over defendants. R. 49-50. M., 98-99. L. 
1Appellant's claim that the trial judge decided the 
matter "without any evidenciary [sic] hearing" (Br. 9) simply 
is untrue. The court received afIICravits, deposition testimony 
and exhibits--all the evidence which either side chose to pre-
sent. ~- 49. M., 98. L. The opposing parties' evidence turned 
out to be free of significant contradiction, although their in-
ferences from that evidence were diametrically opposed. 
2Appellant's statement that the trial court "noted 
that both parties relied solely on the deposition of George L. 
Smith as the sole matter of evidence" (Br. 5 n.2) is mislead-
ing and inconsistent with the Judgmentsand Orders of Dismissal 
which plaintiff's own counsel approved as to form. It is plain 
from the Judgments, and was plain from the trial judge's in-
quiries to counsel during oral argument, that the court based 
its decision upon the entire record. (Although two depositions 
were taken during discovery, neither party moved for publication 
of George M. Smith's deposition, although either could have 
~one so.) The court's remark in its Memorandum Decision that 
, [George L.] Smith's deposition was received and published and 
ooth counsel rely upon this as the sole matter of evidence" (~. 47. M. 96. L.) obviously referred to counsel's election to 
pu?lish only one of the two depositions. Judge Conder's in-
9uiry into the parties' positions was thorough and painstaking; 
1t would be irresponsible to suggest the contrary. 
-3-
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2. The Evidence 
In proceedings before the trial court, defendants 
placed in evidence, by affidavit or deposition, a number 
factual statements which were not controverted by any evic: 
offered by plaintiff. That evidence eliminated the Compk 
unverified allegations (B,. 3. M., 3. L.) that defendants h;: 
plied for loans in Salt Lake City, that the notes providec 
payment in Salt Lake City and that defendants had transac'.e 
business in person in Utah. 
a. Neither defendant ever had transacted 
business in person in Utah. R. 6. H. , 8. L. 
b. Defendants were solicited to execute 
the promissory notes (which represented defen-
dants' alleged indebtedness to plaintiff-aopel-
lant) in New York State and made application for 
those notes in New York State. R. 6. M., 8. L 
c. The notes did not specify a place of 
payment and, in fact, were discounted to the 
Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Berkeley, 
California. Had the notes become payable, thev 
would have been payable to the California bank 
R. 72, 82-83, 85, 90. L. 
d. The proceeds from the notes were aooliec 
to partial maintenance of a livestock feeding 
-4-
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located in Yuma, Arizona and Riverside, Cali-
fornia. R. 9, 73. M., 6. L.; George L. Smith 
Deposition, p. 11, lines 7-10. 
Plaintiff-appellant's contention of jurisdiction, both 
at the hearing below and on appeal, was that one George L. 
Smith--or a company known as GLS Livestock Company, Inc., which 
apparently was his alter ego (Smith Dep., p. 3, lines 16-25, p. 
5, lines 1-18, p. 34, lines 22-25, p. 35, lines 1-2)--had 
transacted business in Utah as defendants' agent, thus subject-
ing them to Utah jurisdiction. ~- 36. M., 36. L. Plaintiff-
appellant' s contention before the trial court was identical to 
its contention on appeal: that "an agency relationship [ex-
istedl between George L. Smith and the defendants such as would 
establish long arm jurisdiction over them." Br. 11. 
The record does not reveal significant dispute concern-
ing the details of George L. Smith's relationship with defen-
dants: 
a. George L. Smith (hereinafter "Smith"), 
the son of George M. Smith, Producers' president 
(~. 38. M., 38. L.; Smith Dep., p. 39, lines 7-9), 
was an entrepeneur engaged in the business of man-
aging herds or "pools" of cattle in which he sold 
interests to investors. Smith Dep., p. 5, line 
25, p 6, lines 1-25, p. 15, lines 12-16. 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
b. Defendants were two of a number f · o in-
vestors who invested in one of Smith's herds 
known as the "Norwood Cattle Feeding Pool". 
Smith Dep. , p _ 25, lines 21-25, p. 26, lines 1-
12. 
c. Smith purchased the lives tock for the 
Norwood Pool in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi 
and Arizona. He raised, and later sold, the cat· 
tle in Arizona and California. Smith Dep., p. 
11, lines 3-13. 
d. Smith managed his herds during periodic 
visits to the stockyards in Arizona and Califor-
nia in which they were kept. Smith Dep., p. 18, 
lines 16-25, p. 19, lines 1-25, p. 20, lines 1-2) 
p. 21, lines 1-7. 4 
e. Smith promoted Producers as a lender to 
defendants and to other investors. Smith De_r_.,' 
12, lines 19-25, p. 13, lines 1-4. 
4Appellant has reproduced in its entirety ar. af'.:: 
of George L. Smith which was prepared after hi~ d~posir~;r 
filed in opposition to defendants' Motion to Dismiss. _ 
Certain paragraphs of that affidavit refer generall'l,r· :'.: 
several years of managing livestock for investors w~\re;·, 
refer specifically to his dealings with defendants t 1d ""': 
Levatich. The affidavit states that Smith consumI11afte 5; h rom -· purchases and sales of livestock ... by telep one · ,_. 
Lake City", but avoids stating that any of those sales-· 
cattle in the Norwood Pool. 
-6-
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f. Smith at no time had a written agree-
ment with either defendant. Smith Dep., p. 12, 
lines 6-9. 
g. Smith at no time acted under defendants' 
supervision. He was advised of their investment 
objective and pursued that objective as he saw 
fit. He testified as follows: 
Q What active role, if any, did your 
clients take in your cattle management bus-
iness? 
A Through 1974 mostly deciding that 
they either wanted to get in or they wanted 
to get out. That probably should be expanded 
to say through 1975. 
Q Was that the extent of their partici-
pation? 
A They borrowed the money, provided the 
funds, received the tax benefits, if any, and 
generally just as I stated if they wanted in 
or they wanted out. 
Q Would the statement you have just made 
about your clients' participation have been 
an accurate description of Hr. Miller's and 
Mr. Levatich's participation? 
A I think it's accurate. They directed 
me to--that they needed "X" tax loss and I 
proceeded to generate it. 
Smith Dep., p. 21, lines 19-25, p. 25, lines 1-7. 
Neither defendant ever instructed Smith concerning 
any aspect of the pool's management. Smith Dep., 
p. 23, lines 8-18. 
-7-
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE INSTMJT 
ACTION FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
1. Plaintiff has failed to discharge its bur-
den of proof that defendants transacted 
business within the State, either in oerson 
or through an agent. 
Plaintiff has predicated its claim of personal j~: 
diction upon UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-24(1) (1977 Supp.), wr.~. 
provides: 
Any person . . . who in person or through an agent 
does any of the following enumerated acts, sub-
mits himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts 
of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) The transaction of any business 
within this state; 
Plaintiff's claim of jurisdiction over defendan:; 
based upon the allegation that George L. Smith transacted' 
stantial business in Utah as defendants' agent. It is th: 
of this jurisdiction that a plaintiff asserting persor:al > 
isdiction over a defendant bears the burden of proving::: 
f 1 . . Sk. C Unio!1 Plaf:_c factual basis o that c aim. Union i o. v. ~ 
Corp., 548 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Utah 1976). Cf.,~, 
') O'Ha'· }fotors Acceutance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (193° : __;......:..:. 
-8-
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International Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 
1971). Similarly, a party alleging an agency between other 
persons bears the burden of proving the facts necessary to es-
tablish that relationship. Wilkerson v. Stevens, 16 Utah 2d 
if24, 426, 403 P.2d 31 (Utah 1965). 
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to establish 
that George L. Smith, defendants' alleged agent, performed a 
single act on their behalf in the State of Utah. Indeed, under 
extensive questioning, Mr. Smith testified that he had pur-
chased livestock for defendants' accounts in Texas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi and Arizona and maintained and sold that livestock 
in Arizona and California and that he managed that herd during 
periodic visits to stockyards in Arizona and California; he 
testified to no acts in Utah. Smith Dep. , p. 11, lines 3-13, 
p. 18, lines 16-25, p. 25, lines 1-25, p. 20, lines 1-25, p. 
21, lines 1- 7. Plaintiff has attempted to circumvent that tes-
timony--which its counsel chose not to cross-examine--by of-
fering an affidavit by Mr. Smith which carefully refrains from 
specifying that he had undertaken any transactions on defen-
dants' behalf while in Utah. Note 4, supra. Plaintiff has 
failed to prove a single transaction in Utah by Smith as de-
fendants' agent. In order to establish jurisdiction, plain-
tiff--in addition to proving agency--must prove substantial 
activity in Utah. This Court 
has consistently held that the transaction 
of husiness 1vithin the meaning of our [Long-Arm] 
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statute requires that defendant has engaged in 
some substantial activity with some degree of 
continuity within this State. 
Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., supra at l259. ~ 
Cate Rental Co. v. Whalen & Co. , 549 P. 2d 707, 708 (Utah . 
Plaintiff further has failed to demonstrate facts. 
which George Smith could have been found to have been de'.c· 
dants' agent in any event. Smith has testified that defe:.: 
"directed me to--that they needed "X" tax loss and I proc<0. 
generate it." Smith Dep., p. 22, lines 6-7. Defendantse: 
cised no control over how Smith managed the Arizona-Califo: 
cattle pool and nothing in the record suggests that they·;; 
entitled or able (at three thousand miles' distance) too: 
One person or concern becomes an agent for another and su:. 
to another only through a "consent" that he "shall act on 
other's] behalf and subject to his control. . . . " RESTATE:'. 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957), §1. This was not the nature o: 
Smith's relationship with defendants; although he periodi:: 
reported the pool's operations to his clients, the client; 
role in the business consisted of "deciding that they eit:: 
wanted to get in or ... get out." Smith Den., p. 21, lir.e 
21-22. 
This Court held in Thiokol Chem. Corp. v · P~ 
15 Utah 2d 355, 358-359, 393 P.2d 391 (1964): 
The line of demarcation between one who , 
apposec 
operates as an independent contractor as 
-10-
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to one who is the servant or agent of another 
is sometimes a bit blurred. This court has on 
a number of occasions confronted this problem 
and set forth various criteria to be considered 
in making the proper classification. The most 
fundamental one relates to the extent of control 
by the one who hires over the one who performs 
the service. If the employer's will is repre-
sented only by a desired result, the indication 
is of an independent contractor; whereas, if the 
employer exercises control over the means of ac-
complishing the result, this points toward an 
agent or servant relationship. 
The question before the Court was whether properties 
used by Thiokol in missle research and development were immune 
from state taxation by reason of a purported agency relation-
ship with the Federal Government. The Court held that Thiokol 
could not be deemed as agent of the Federal Government in its 
research and development operation, even though it performed 
that task pursuant to a written contract, because the contract's 
"import ... is to require of Thiokol to produce the end results, 
and it does not specify in detail how the research and develop-
ment shall be conducted." Id. , 15 Utah 2d at 359. Certainly, 
the "import" of defendants' relationship with Smith was to pro-
duce end results, not to specify how the livestock investment 
was to be managed. 
Plaintiff has urged that "there is nothing whatsoever 
in the record before the Court even to remotely suggest that 
defendants ever contracted or gave up the right to control 
their agent." Br. 10. However, there is nothing in the record 
-11-
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to suggest that defendants ever had a right to controls-
in the first instance. Plaintiff has offered no author:: 
for the proposition that a person standing in Smith's re', 
ship to defendants could be deemed their agent. Plainti'. 
assertion that "[a) gency is created when there is a mani'.• 
tion in some way . . . that the agent may act upon tht: oth:: 
[sic) account" (Br. 8) is unsound. In Thiokol, for exarnn 
there was no question that the alleged agent was authori:; 
act upon the Government's account. However, because Thie 
responsibility to the Government was limited to achievi~~ 
sired result, rather than performing under the Government' 
control, it was found to be an independent contractor,:;: 
than an agent. 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction never has been bu~ 
a relationship as remote as that of Smith and the defendt 
Indeed, in White v. Arthur Murray Co. , 549 P. 2d 439, 440 
1976), this Court found that not even a franchisee, whose 
erations were subject to some substantial review by its i:. 
chisor, was that franchisor's agent for purposes of th<~­
Arm Statute. The sole authority which plaintiff cites ir 
'" port of its agency claim, Packaging Corp. of America~ 
1' ' 
561 P. 2d 680 (Utah 1977) (cited at Br. 7), has no app.ica 
to this case. 1 . ti ff der:cr:· In Packaging Corporation, ?-ain · 
i=· , r' 
that defendant's control of his Utah agent was sufdcie ... 
-12-
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subject him to the State's jurisdiction. In this case, no such 
control has been demonstrated. 
2. This Court should accord substantial 
weight to the trial court's findings. 
It is this Court's wise and long-standing practice to 
accord substantial deference to trial courts in determining 
whether a defendant's alleged presence in Utah was sufficient 
to justify long-arm jurisdiction. Union Ski Co. v. Union Plas-
tics Corp., supra at 1259. The trial court diligently reviewed 
the evidence and has reached a decision which more than ade-
quately was supported by the record before it. That decision 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, defendant-respondents 
respectfully urge that the Judgments and Orders of the trial 
court be affirmed. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 1977. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
McCARTHY 
Ricardo B. Ferrari 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Defendant-
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-24 
Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Acts submittin oerson t,;i 
Juris iction. - Any person, notwithstanding section 1 _ . ' 
102, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state J 
in person or through an agent does any of the following'e;:J 
erated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his pe: 1
1 
sonal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts o'. 
this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) The transaction of any business within I 
this state; I 
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods 
in this state; 
(3) The causing of any injury within this 
state whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty; 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
The ownership, use, or possession of any 
real estate situated in this state; 
Contracting to insure any person, prop-
erty or risk located within this state 
at the time of contracting. 
With respect to actions of divorce and. 
separate maintenance, the maintenance in 
this state of a matrimonial domicile at 
the time the claim arose or the commis~ 
sion in this state of the act giving nse 
to the claim. 
-14-
I 
--
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
